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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
Plaintiff submits this brief in reply to the brief of defendants. The statement 
of the facts and the statement of the issues on appeal are unchanged from plaintiff's 
opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The sale of Mary Jean Freebairn's property to Russell Scott is invalid as a 
matter of law because Miss Freebairn lacked the mental capacity to execute a deed to 
the property as required by law. Additionally, the agreement between the parties for the 
purchase of the land was an executory contract and was not performed until after Miss 
Freebairn was adjudged incompetent and after Mr. Scott was appointed her guardian. 
Because the requisite judicial authorization was not obtained, the sale of property is 
invalid. 
2. Even if the transaction was not invalid as a matter of law, it should have 
been set aside because the plaintiff lacked the requisite mental capacity to contract for 
the sale of her property. Contrary to the defendants' assertion, Utah law requires that 
one be able to act with discretion in relation to a contract in addition to being able to 
understand the contract to have the requisite mental capacity to contract. 
3. The trial court's finding that Miss Freebairn had the requisite mental 
capacity to contract is clearly erroneous. The evidence established that she suffered 
from a mental disease which deprived her of her ability to act with discretion in relation 
to the contract, and, in all probability, she did not even understand the transaction. 
4. Miss Freebairn and Mr. Scott were parties to a confidential relationship 
at the time of the execution of both the contract and the deed. Mr. Scott intended to 
assume the duties of a trustee as stated in the Earnest Money Agreement, and they were 
guardian and ward prior to the execution of the deed. Both of these relationships 
unquestionably constitute fiduciary relationships. As parties to a confidential 
relationship, Mr. Scott had a fiduciary duty toward Miss Freebairn and thus a presumption 
arose that the transaction was unfair. At trial, Mr. Scott failed to rebut this presumption 
and show that the transaction was fair. In fact, the evidence clearly shows that Mr. Scott 
reaped an unfair advantage from the transaction. 
5. If this court reverses the decision of the lower court, the proper remedy 
in this case would be the imposition of a constructive trust. This would simply result in 
Mr. Scott returning to Miss Freebairn the profit he earned by dealing with her property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT THE 
CONVEYANCE FROM MISS FREEBAIRN TO MR. SCOTT WAS VOID AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. A GRANTOR MUST HAVE MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF 
EXECUTING A DEED. 
Defendants contend that the plaintiffs mental capacity on the date she 
executed the deed is irrelevant and that only proof of her incompetence when she signed 
the Earnest Money Agreement can invalidate a transaction. In fact, the law requires that 
a grantor have the requisite competency on the date the deed is executed and delivered. 
In addressing the requirements for the valid delivery of a deed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that it is the intention of a transferor at the time of delivery 
which governs a deed's validity: 
Where a deed is executed with no intent to transfer a present interest, it 
will be invalidated. . . . This Court has held that a conveyance is valid 
only upon delivery of a deed with present intent to transfer. . . . 
Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632 at 635 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). See also. Anderson v. 
Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95 at 100 (Utah App. 1988) [hereinafter Brinkerhoffl: Chadd v. 
Moser, 25 Utah 369, 71 P. 870 (1903). 
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Obviously, if a grantor lacks the requisite mental capacity, he cannot form the 
intent to deliver a deed that the law requires. Therefore, even if he was in full possession 
of his faculties when contracting for the sale of his land, lack of capacity at the time he 
signs a deed will render that conveyance ineffective. 
Other jurisdictions have also held that a transferor must have competence at 
the time of the deed's delivery and execution. See Shepard v. First American Mortgage 
Co.. 289 S.C. 516, 347 S.E.2d 118 at 119 (S.C. App. 1986), ("At common law, where a 
person is mentally incompetent at the time he executes a legal instrument, and the 
person taking the instrument has knowledge of that fact, the transaction is void."); 26 
C.J.S.. "Deeds" § 54 at p. 720 (1956) ("Capacity should be measured as of the date of the 
execution and delivery of the instrument."); Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law 
of Real Property § 2968 at p. 176 (1957) ("The deed of an insane man under guardianship 
is absolutely void."); Powell, Powell on Real Property. 1f 896 at p. 1028 (1968) ("The 
mental competence of the grantor at the time when the delivery is claimed to have 
occurred is vital."). 
Furthermore, in Ryan v. Colombo. 77 Or. App. 71, 712 P.2d 139 (1985), the 
court found that the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proving capacity, and observed 
that 
A grantor is required to possess greater competency to execute a deed 
than is required of one executing a will, because a deed is irrevocable and 
a will is not, and also because a grantor, unlike a testator must deal with 
another party to the transaction. 
Id. at 142. 
Defendants concede that no delivery of the deed in this instance occurred until 
after the plaintiff was found incompetent and after the grantee was declared her 
guardian. A closing scheduled for March 1, 1971 did not occur because title to plaintiff's 
property was in trust with Security Title Company. Since plaintiff lacked capacity on 
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March 23, 1971, the date of the execution of the deed and the day after the order of 
guardianship was entered, the deed should be cancelled. 
B. ON THE DATE THE GUARDIANSHIP WAS INSTITUTED, THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS EXECUTORY AND 
UNENFORCEABLE WITHOUT JUDICIAL APPROVAL. 
The plaintiff does not dispute that in the ordinary case the principle of 
equitable conversion applies to an earnest money agreement and that if the agreement 
itself is enforceable, the purchaser is regarded as holding an equitable interest in the 
property. The agreement remains an executory contract however, and in the case at bar, 
on the date the seller was declared incompetent and the purchaser was appointed her 
guardian, the purchaser had not yet tendered the purchase price, and the seller had not 
given a deed to the property. 
The trial court included among its Findings of Fact a finding that "the closing 
occurred on March 1, 1971." (See Memorandum Decision and Judgment, Finding of Fact 
1f 17.) This is a finding which is wholly contradicted by the evidence. There was some 
testimony that the parties signed a closing statement on that date, however, it is 
undisputed that both a deed and the promissory note were not given until later. 
(Tr. 109-110, 120-121) Thus, in the ordinary sense of the word, the sale did not close by 
the date provided for in the Earnest Money Agreement. Unless the failure to close in a 
timely manner was waived by the parties, this failure was itself a defense to the 
enforcement of the Earnest Money Agreement which a truly disinterested guardian, as 
the law requires, might have asserted. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
presence of an explicit time provision "in and of itself, connotes that time was of the 
essence." Griffeth v. Zumbrennen. 577 P.2d 129 at 131 (Utah 1978). It cannot be said 
that Miss Freebairn, after a judicial finding of incompetency and the appointment of a 
guardian to act on her behalf in business transactions, could have accomplished a 
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valid waiver, defined under Utah law as the "intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Company. 704 P.2d 573 at 578 (Utah 1985). 
Likewise, the Earnest Money Agreement contemplates the establishment of a 
trust and the drafting of a trust instrument which was never accomplished. Again, 
someone acting on behalf of the seller without Mr. Scott's total conflict of interest, 
might have asserted this failure to comply with the terms of the agreement as a defense 
to its enforcement. 
The facts of this case illustrate why Utah's former Probate Code expressly 
required court approval of any sale by a guardian of the ward's property. (See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 75-13-32, 75-13-33, 75-13-42, 75-10-2 and 75-10-3 (repealed and replaced in 
1975), set out in their entirety on pages 2-3 of Plaintiff's Opening Brief, and the 
discussion of those sections found at pages 23-26 of Plaintiff's Opening Brief.) Given 
that the very purpose of a guardianship is to conserve the property of someone who has 
demonstrated an inability to make rational judgments about his own affairs, the law did 
not permit even an impartial guardian to make the ultimate decision about whether a 
transfer of property was in the ward's interests; it was the court's responsibility to 
exercise that discretion. To ensure the court's opportunity to pass upon any sale, the 
Legislature specifically provided in former Utah Code Ann. § 75-10-3 that ". . . no title 
passes unless the sale is confirmed by the court." 
Given that on the date Miss Freebairn's guardianship was instituted the 
contract between the guardian and the ward was executory, and neither a deed nor a 
promissory note had been exchanged, it is wholly illogical to conclude that the sale had 
already occurred and therefore was not subject to the requirement that the sale of the 
property be approved or confirmed by the court. In this instance, the existence of this 
unperformed contract was deliberately concealed. The judge who appointed Mr. Scott as 
the guardian of Miss Freebairn never knew that Mr. Scott, a few weeks beforehand, 
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had accepted Miss Freebairn's signature on an agreement to convey to him virtually the 
entire estate which, as guardian, he was required to conserve. 
In view of these undisputed facts, the trial court erred in not concluding that 
the conveyance was invalid as a matter of law.l^ 
POINT II 
CONTRACTUAL CAPACITY UNDER UTAH LAW REQUIRES BOTH AN ABILITY 
TO UNDERSTAND AN AGREEMENT AND AN ABILITY TO ACT 
WITH DISCRETION IN RELATION TO IT 
Defendants contend that the test for contractual capacity is merely whether a 
party has the ability to understand the document he signs. Their position is that if a 
person can understand the words contained in a written contract, the fact that a mental 
disease prevents him from being able to rationally chose whether or not to enter into the 
agreement, is irrelevant. Plaintiff agrees that understanding is one part of determining 
competency. However, contractual capacity also requires that a person be capable of 
acting with discretion in relation to the contract. 
There is no basis for disputing the test for contractual capacity in Utah; it has 
been repeated in numerous decisions without variation: 
Were the mental facilities so deficient or impaired that there was not 
sufficient power to comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature 
and its probable consequences, and to act with discretion in relation 
thereto, or with relation to the ordinary affairs of life? 
Anderson v. Thomas. 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 at 146 (1945) (emphasis added); See also 
Brinkerhoff. 
It is clear that this test has two components, one which concerns the cognitive 
ability of the contracting party to understand the contents of the document, and a second 
y Contrary to the defendants' assertion, the plaintiff continues to challenge, 
as it has, both below and throughout this appeal, the trial court's "finding" that "the 
appointment of a guardian following this sale was not in and of itself a basis for avoiding 
the sale."; e.g. Docketing Statement, Para. 5(a) 
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which focuses on his ability to make a rational judgment about the contract, that is, to 
"act with discretion" in relation to it. 
It is true that some courts have in the past focused exclusively on the cognitive 
abilities of a contracting party. However, even courts which rely on the cognitive test 
have recognized an exception for cases of "insane delusions," and the modern view, as 
incorporated in the Restatement Second of Contracts, is that courts should examine both 
an actor's cognitive abilities and his ability to rationally control his actions, before 
finding contractual capacity. Restatement (2d) Contracts § 15 (1981). (See discussion at 
pages 31-32 of Plaintiff's Opening Brief). Courts have long recognized that a person who 
is intermittently rational may suffer from delusions which, when intertwined with the 
subject matter of a business transaction, deprive him of contractual capacity. See Hanks 
v. McNeil Coal Corp.. 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 at 260 (1946) (contractual capacity is 
lacking when one is incapable of "acting rationally in the transaction"); See also 17 C.J.S... 
"Contracts" § 133(1)(1963). 
Furthermore, even courts which may describe the test for contractual capacity 
as one which concerns a party's "understanding" typically recognize that mere 
understanding is not enough if a mental disease has deprived a party of the ability to 
bargain. See First Christian Church In Salem v. McReynolds. 194 Or. 68, 241 P.2d 135 at 
137 (1952), (cited with approval by this court in Brinkerhoff) (". . . a grantor must be able 
to reason, to exercise judgment, to transact ordinary business and to compete with the 
other party to the transaction.") 
A legal test which focuses exclusively on cognitive capacity has been severely 
criticized. It was noted in a comment entitled "Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts", 
57 Mich. L. Rev. 1020 (1959), that the cognitive test of contractual capacity has its 
origins in a primitive scientific understanding of mental illness. Id- at 1033. 
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The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, after reviewing decisions from other courts 
which rejected the single prong "understanding" test, held: 
We believe that the understanding test does fail to afford the finder 
of facts the opportunity to determine whether a person who is mentally 
ill, having met the standard of cognition, nevertheless lacks the ability to 
control his conduct, at the time the contract was made, because of his 
mental affliction. 
Nohra v. Evans. 509 S.W. 2d 648 at 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See also Note, 39 
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 356, "Manic-Depressive Held Incompetent to Contract Despite Apparent 
Ability to Understand Transaction" (1964); Ortelere v. Teacher's Retirement Board of 
New York. 25 N.Y.2d 196, 250 N.E.2d 460 (1969). 
It seems clear that the law of contractual capacity in this state has always 
focused on both aspects of a person's mental state and that the Restatements test of 
contractual capacity discussed in Plaintiff's Opening Brief is wholly consistent with the 
law of Utah.2/ 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD THE 
MENTAL CAPACITY TO CONTRACT IS CLEARLY WRONG 
The defendants contend that the plaintiff misunderstands the standard of 
review to be applied by this court to the trial Judge's findings. 
Actually, there is no mystery about the applicable standard of review: this 
court will set aside the findings of the trial court if they are against the clear weight of 
& It is true that some jurisdictions hold that the deed or contract of an 
incompetent under guardianship is merely "voidable" rather than void. Where the 
contracts or deeds are "void" they are a nullity from the outset. Where they are 
"voidable" the incompetent has the power to avoid them but must assert the right of 
avoidance. 39 C.J.S.. "Guardian and Ward" § 99 at p. 201 (1976); 26 C.J.S.. "Deeds" 
§ 68(a) at p. 788 (1956). Since in this instance the incompetent has asserted that the 
transaction is void, the distinction is irrelevant. 
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the evidence. Brinkerhoff at 98. The question of Miss Freebairn's capacity is a mixed 
question of law and fact. Under the proper legal standard for contractual competency, 
the evidence is overwhelming that Miss Freebairn lacked contractual capacity both on 
January 13, 1971, the day she signed the Earnest Money Agreement, and on March 23, the 
day she signed a deed conveying her property to her guardian. 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff "was intelligent, 
educated and had the ability to understand the terms of the sale, despite her mental 
illness". It concluded, therefore, that she "had the contractual capacity to enter into a 
legally binding contract." (See Memorandum Decision and Judgment, Finding of Fact 
1f 27, Conclusions of Law 1f 4). 
Evidence which arguably supports the trial court's finding of competency can 
be found in the testimony of the Le R Burton, Agnes Freebairn ("Mrs. Freebairn") and Dr. 
Carl Malouf. 
Le R Burton was the realtor who prepared the Earnest Money Agreement. He 
was a friend and long time business associate of the purchaser, Mr. Scott. He was the 
secretary-treasurer and a director of the Scott Investment Corporation, the family 
corporation through which Mr. Scott funneled the purchase of the disputed property. He 
earned a significant commission through the transaction by reselling building lots in the 
subdivision developed by the late Sam Freebairn. He is a defendant in this action. (Tr. 
719-723, 749, 700-702). 
Mr. Burton testified that the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement were 
dictated in their entirety by Miss Freebairn: that she set the purchase price, that she was 
diligent in contacting Mr. La Mar Duncan for advice about the transaction, that she was 
concerned about the tax consequences of the transaction, that the trust provision was her 
idea and that she never indicated that she needed money from the sale to combat the 
efforts of her persecutors. (Tr. 684-691). 
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Mrs. Agnes Freebairn testified that she was also present when the plaintiff 
signed the Earnest Money Agreement. (Tr. 544) Mrs. Freebairn was anxious to find a 
buyer for the property to relieve her of the obligation to develop it (which she was unable 
to do) and to save her home, which served as collateral for her late husband's 
development loan, from foreclosure. At a deposition taken several months before trial, 
Mrs. Freebairn denied having been present when the Earnest Money Agreement was 
executed, but at trial recalled having been present. (Tr. 544-546). 
Mrs. Freebairn testified that she and the plaintiff approached Mr. Burton 
together to seek a buyer for the property, that she was present when Mr. Burton prepared 
the Earnest Money Agreement on January 13, that she "sat back and Mary talked with Le 
R about the way they wanted to set this up . . .", that they discussed the need to 
terminate the prior trust agreement, that they discussed the terms "back and forth . . . 
like any people that were discussing business . . .", and that the plaintiff conducted 
herself in a "business like" manner. She denied that there was any discussion about the 
plaintiff needing money to combat her persecutors, and stated that she did not appear 
panicked except in the sense that her creditors were closing in on her. (Tr. 529-533) 
Finally, Dr. Carl Malouf, who confirmed that the plaintiff suffered from a 
paranoid delusional disorder, testified that in his opinion on the date of the signing of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, the plaintiff would have had "adequate knowledge to know if 
she was selling something, what she was selling, what she was receiving for it, those sorts 
of specifics." (Tr. 497) 
Turning to the evidence which weighs against the trial court's conclusion, there 
is, to begin with, the consensus among both parties' experts that the plaintiff suffered 
from a serious mental illness which had been present for many years prior to the 
transaction in question. (Tr. 290-295, 497). Her mental illness involved an elaborate 
delusional scheme through which she imagined being hounded by a group of persecutors 
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who interfered with many of her daily activities and interposed themselves between 
herself and others, including her lawyer, doctor, hairdresser, banker, etc. (Tr. 60). This 
is not a case of someone who simply suffers from "senility" or eccentric behavior; she was 
undisputedly seriously mentally ill at the time she signed the contract. 
Next, there is the dramatically different description of the transaction which 
Miss Freebairn gave. (The transcript of this testimony is set out in Appendix A). 
Miss Freebairn testified that prior to January 13, 1971 she had never met La 
Mar Duncan although she knew that Mr. Scott had arranged for Mr. Duncan to draft the 
"protective mortgage" she gave him, and to handle another matter, but that she had never 
talked to him about the sale of this property. She said that she told Le R Burton and 
Russell Scott on January 13 that she was not prepared to discuss anything about her 
property that day and that if she gave her signature, it could only be on the condition that 
she could take it to a lawyer for advice first, and that if he advised against it they would 
disregard her signature. She testified that she did not know how the purchase price had 
been computed but that it was "outrageous" and made her "absolutely ill"; that the trust 
was not her idea, that she only signed the agreement because she was told they needed 
her signature to "get going". She testified that she had been told by the defendant and 
another cousin that if she were to sell her property it should be to them. She testified 
that, two weeks later, after hearing nothing further, she went to Mr. Duncan's office, 
that he told her she had already exchanged her real property for an unsecured note, 
which, she said, made her sick. (Tr. 238-245). 
Miss Freebairn testified additionally that she was dealing with "an invisible 
influence" in the form of Mr. Stuart Udall whom she expected to intervene and keep her 
from having to go through with the transaction because he had so much money that he 
could fly surveillance planes over her house. She testified that she heard conversations in 
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her home which she perceived to include Mr. Udall, but that although she had asked him 
several times to meet her, he had not come forth. (Tr. 236-248). 
It is not uncommon for interested parties to a lawsuit to give opposing 
descriptions of a disputed transaction. There is, however, an important piece of 
additional contemporary evidence which wholly corroborates the plaintiff's position on 
appeal. 
On March 1, 1971 the plaintiff made a phone call to Herbert Halladay, a person 
disinterested in the outcome of this action, and the trust officer who had been in charge 
of Miss Freebairn's trust agreement with her late brother and her sister-in-law. On that 
day, the property was still subject to the trust agreement and legal title was still held by 
Security Title. This was the day the "closing" of the transaction was said to have 
occurred, although as noted, no deed was given by the seller and no note was given by the 
purchaser until much later. (Tr. 389-391). This conversation between Miss Freebairn and 
Mr. Halladay took place six weeks after Miss Freebairn allegedly dictated the terms of 
the Earnest Money Agreement to Mr. Burton and conducted herself in the "business like" 
manner which Agnes Freebairn belatedly recalled. Mr. Halladay's contemporaneous 
memorandum states, as follows: 
Duncan wants Mary Jean F. to establish a guardian for her. Alleges 
William Smart at Deseret News is guilty of a conspiracy ag. her. Russell 
Scott now tired of helping her and only has done so in the past because he 
wants her land. They offered her $500.00 per month income. She said 
$250.00 for her and $250.00 for her nieces and nephews college educ. Cut 
value of contract about $20,000—forcing her to pay for water pipe. 
William Smart involved in her life—very complicated—the xeroxing she 
has done would reveal the whole story. Sending people to her house at all 
hours to entrap her. She complained to Bruce McConkie and visit stopped. 
As noted in Plaintiff's Opening Brief, this memorandum reveals several 
important things about the plaintiff's mental state on the day of the so-called closing. 
First, it suggests that she still did not regard the contract as a fully consummated, 
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binding agreement. Second, she discloses a serious factual misunderstanding about the 
agreement she signed; she is totally wrong about the purchase price, and imagines 
payments being made for her niece's and nephews' education which are simply not any 
part of the agreement. Third, she speaks in terms of compulsion, "being forced" to pay 
for a water pipe (referring to one of the credits Mr. Scott was taking from the purchase 
price). Finally, she intertwines her delusional references to her other persecutors with 
her paranoia about this transaction: "Russell Scott now tired of helping her and has only 
done so in the past because he wants her land." 
It is telling that, in contrast to Mr. Burton who portrayed Miss Freebairn as 
astute and sophisticated about her business dealings, Mr. Halladay, a witness without any 
personal interest in the pending dispute gave this testimony: 
Q. Did you form an impression during the occasions when you spoke 
with Miss Freebairn about the extent to which she appeared to understand 
the nature of her business with Security Title? 
A. Well, I do have a recollection of that because I can remember Sam 
telling me that he was looking {sic} at ("out for"} Mary Jean and that he 
had — for some time that she needed help. And there were occasions 
when Mary Jean was there to see me that I felt like she understood 
whatever it was we were talking about and there were other occasions 
when I knew from what she said that she really didn't understand what 
was happening. 
(Tr. 392). 
Next, among the evidence which weighs against the trial court's finding of 
competency, is the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Stephen Golding, quoted at length on 
pages 33 through 37 of Plaintiff's Opening Brief. Dr. Golding expressed his opinions based 
on a review of materials written by Miss Freebairn near the time of the disputed 
transaction, testing of Miss Freebairn by Dr. Malouf, and of his own examinations of her. 
He concluded that Miss Freebairn signed the Earnest Money Agreement as the result of 
"panic caused by the delusional system and her mental disorder . . .", that "she did not 
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have the rational anticipation of the nature of the transaction, although she understood 
she was selling land," that she suffered from an internal delusional "coercion" in signing 
the agreement, and that she did not look upon the contract, or the world as a whole with 
a "free and rational intellect" (Tr. 304-310). 
None of this testimony was refuted by the defendants' expert, Dr. Malouf, as 
noted, who merely concluded that Miss Freebairn would have had "adequate knowledge to 
know if she was selling something, what she was selling, what she was receiving for it, 
those sorts of specifics." (Tr. 497) 
As if the scales did not weigh heavily enough against the finding of competency 
without them, the astounding judicial admissions of Mr. Scott himself are important 
evidence as well. Less than six weeks after entering into the Earnest Money Agreement 
which acknowledges his need to protect Miss Freebairn as her "trustee", Mr. Scott swore 
under oath that she was "incompetent, . . . incapable without the assistance of some 
other person to properly manage and care for her property," and "likely to be deceived or 
imposed upon by artful or designing persons." 
Several years later, in a verified answer filed in the Third District Court 
(which, contrary to the assertion of the defendants' in their brief, was received in 
evidence in this matter as Exhibit 30P), Mr. Scott swore that Miss Freebairn was "wholly 
incompetent and unable to comprehend the meaning of the contract heretofore entered 
into and therefore said contract is a nullity." As a separate legal defense he asserted 
that on March 22, 1971 Miss Freebairn was adjudicated incompetent "because of certain 
mental disorders," and that she was therefore "unable to enter into any contract 
whatsoever." (Exhibit 30P, Tr. 188). 
True, the contract to which Mr. Scott's sworn statements were directed in 
Exhibit 30P was entered into in 1981. But the defendants' own expert, Dr. Malouf, 
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testified that in his opinion Miss Freebairn's condition was essentially the same when he 
examined her in 1983 as it would have been in 1971. (Tr. 491). 
Now that the disputed issue is whether Mr. Scott is entitled to keep the large 
profit he earned by acquiring Miss Freebairn's property, he would have the court believe 
that she was a rational business woman who knew exactly what she was doing when she 
agreed to sell her property to him. In other contexts, however, he has sworn to the 
contrary, and his judicial admission that Miss Freebairn was incapable of managing her 
own affairs and was unable to understand a contract are important additional pieces of 
evidence in support of the plaintiff's position on appeal. 
The trial court noted in Finding of Fact No. 14 that the plaintiff had transacted 
"a number of loans and sales" prior to this transaction, "and there was no evidence 
presented that she didn't understand the nature of those transactions." This finding is not 
supportive of the conclusion that the plaintiff had contractual capacity to contract on the 
critical dates and is not an accurate description of the evidence. 
First, all such prior transactions were either between Miss Freebairn and Mr. 
Scott, or were arranged by Mr. Burton. They consisted of two sales of land by Miss 
Freebairn to Mr. Scott in the early sixties, and three sales to third parties arranged by 
Mr. Burton and/or Mr. Scott. The sales to Mr. Scott occurred at a time when, it is 
undisputed, Miss Freebairn operated under the delusion that Walt Disney was interested in 
buying her property to build another Disneyland. (Tr. 15-16). One of the sales to third 
parties was a disaster because it included a totally unrealistic agreement by Miss 
Freebairn to install a water line which she was incapable of doing (Tr. 661-662). The 
record is filled with evidence of Miss Freebairn's inability to hold a job, and the various 
overt manifestations of her mental disease during this time period. (Tr. 55-63; 290-295). 
Those prior transactions were not the subject of this lawsuit, and would have been subject 
to different periods of limitations which have probably long since run. 
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This court is not required to affirm the trial court's conclusion about the 
plaintiff's competency simply because some evidence can be found in the record which 
supports that conclusion. The self serving testimony of those who profited from the 
transaction arguably does tend to support such a finding. However, the clear weight of 
the evidence is to the contrary, and when the record as a whole is considered, it is 
apparent that the trial judge was wrong in concluding that the plaintiff had the mental 
capacity to agree to sell her land to Mr. Scott. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT WERE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
PARTIES TO A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP AND 
MR. SCOTT DID NOT CARRY HIS BURDEN OF 
PROVING THAT THE TRANSACTION WAS FAIR 
Incredibly, defendants deny that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
Mr. Scott and Mrs. Freebairn at the critical times in the disputed transaction. However, 
it is a matter of settled law that both trustee/cestui relationships and guardian/ward 
relationships are confidential, and that transactions between them are governed by the 
standards which apply to fiduciaries. 
It is simply beyond dispute that a guardian and a ward occupy a confidential 
relationship. See 39 C.J.S.. "Guardian & Ward" § 3, at p. 13 (1976); In re Estate of 
Swieciki, 106 111. 2d 111, 477 N.E. 2d 488 (111. 1985) ("A fiduciary relationship exists 
between a guardian and a ward as a matter of law"); In re Thelen's Estate. 450 P.2d 123 
(Ariz. App. 1969); In re Johnson's Estate and Guardianship. 320 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1958). As 
of March 22, 1971, Mr. Scott was appointed Miss Freebairn's guardian and he owed her a 
fiduciary duty. Thus, if permitted at all, dealings between them were subject to the 
strict standards which apply to fiduciaries. 
It is equally clear, however, that the parties had a confidential relationship on 
the date the Earnest Money Agreement was executed. It is telling that the agreement 
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itself provides that Mr. Scott will act as a trustee for Miss Freebairn by holding the 
purchase money and disbursing it according to general terms which are outlined in the 
agreement. The Earnest Money Agreement may, indeed, satisfy the requirements for 
forming an inter vivos trust set forth in the Utah case of Sundquist v. Sundquist. 639 P.2d 
181 at 183 (Utah 1981). 
Whether or not the Earnest Money Agreement actually created a trust, it 
clearly demonstrates Mr. Scott's intention to assume the role of a fiduciary from the very 
outset of the disputed transaction. 
Defendants criticize the authority cited by plaintiff in support of her position 
that the parties occupied a confidential relationship.^ They suggest that the leading 
case of Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), is no longer good authority 
because it was criticized in Estate of Jones v. Jones. 759 P.2d 345 (Utah 1988). However, 
the Jones court's only criticism of the Blodgett decision was directed to its dicta 
implication that the parent/child relationship is one which the law automatically 
presumes to be a confidential relationship. Id. at 348. That subject however is not in 
issue here, as Jones does not ctiricize that guardians and wards are in a fiduciary 
relationship. 
The inescapable fact is that Mr. Scott and Miss Freebairn occupied a 
confidential relationship throughout the time during which the disputed transactions 
occurred. 
Without having squarely decided whether Miss Freebairn and Mr. Scott were 
parties to a confidential relationship, the trial court reached the following conclusion: 
3. The defendant did not take advantage of plaintiff, exercise 
undue influence over her, or perpetrate a fraud upon her by purchasing 
plaintiff's property. 
(Memorandum Decision and Judgment, Conclusion 1f 3). 
y The case of Berrett v. Stevens. 690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984) was, in fact, cited 
by mistake; that case begins on the last page of Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Cunningham v. Cunningham. 690 P.2d 549 (Utah 1984) which was referred to earlier in 
Plaintiff's Opening Brief. 
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It being beyond dispute, however, that as they were parties to a confidential 
relationship, it was incumbent upon the court to evaluate the transaction by the standards 
which apply to fiduciaries. As the Supreme Court of Utah has repeatedly held, the burden 
is upon the superior party to convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the transaction was fair. See Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710 at 
713 (1965). And, " . . . if there is found the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair 
advantage, redress will be given to the injured party." Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. 
When all the evidence which relates to the fairness of the transaction is 
considered, it is obvious that the defendant did not carry his burden of proof. Leaving 
aside for the moment the fact that Miss Freebairn was actually paid $57,000 for her 
property on account of "deductions" from the purchase, the claimed sales price of $65,000 
for approximately 25 acres of land should be considered first. This price amounts to 
$2,600 per acre, and one searches the record in vain for evidence that $2,600 an acre was 
a fair price for the property in January, 1971. 
Using the market data approach, plaintiff's expert property appraiser, after 
giving due consideration to the differences between the comparable sales he relied on and 
the subject property, expressed the view that the disputed property was worth $5,500 in 
January, 1971 (Tr. 445). Using the market data approach, the defendants' expert 
concluded that the property was worth $3,100 an acre (Tr. 597-600), and this range in 
values is the one which the court found pertinent in its Memorandum Decision. 
(Memorandum Decision and Judgment, Finding of Fact, 1[ 24). 
However, defendants1 expert went on to say that if the trust agreement 
between Mary Jean Freebairn and her brother, which included an option to purchase the 
entire acreage at $3,000 an acre, was treated as a comparable sale, the market value 
would be "lower" since her brother's $3,000 an acre over 13 years would have to be 
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reduced to present value. (Tr. 599-600). Actually, this option agreement was only in 
effect for two years, and the actual price paid for the acreage purchased by Sam 
Freebairn was a genuine $3,000 per acre. Furthermore, the transaction was not an 
arms-length transaction, and included consideration other than the lot release price. (Ex. 
32P, Appendix B in Plaintiff's Opening Brief). 
The only way the defendants' expert could justify the actual sales price was to 
rely on inadmissible evidence (which the judge himself said he would not consider (Tr. 
607-608)) after which he struggled to the conclusion that $2,600 an acre was "within the 
range of fair market appraisal" for the property (Tr. 614). 
If this were the only evidence on the subject of market value, it would be 
difficult to conclude that the defendant had carried his burden of proof. However, in 
addition to this expert testimony, is the evidence that in the early 1960fs Mr. Scott 
purchased fifteen acres from the same parcel of Miss Freebairn's property for $3,000 an 
acre. And, most importantly, in January, 1972 in the four way trade arranged by Mr. 
Burton, the very same property was sold to a seasoned real estate developer for $6,000 an 
acre, more than twice what Mr. Scott claims to have paid. (Tr. 123-128). 
A finding that the transaction is free from unfairness given this evidence is 
further belied by the fact that Miss Freebairn was not paid $2,600 an acre for the 
property, but was actually paid $2,360 per acre since Mr. Scott allowed himself a credit 
of $6,000 from the purchase price for the cost of installing a water line which Sam 
Freebairn expressly agreed to pay for as part of his option agreement with his sister. 
(Exhibit 32P; See also Plaintiff's Opening Brief, p. 46, and Statement of Facts Therein, 
1MI 9, 10 and 11). 
The Earnest Money Agreement is riddled with other peculiarities as well. 
Unlike any conventional purchase agreement, the one in question provided that the seller 
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would have no security interest in the property she was selling, even though the purchase 
price was to be paid in monthly installments. While it is true that all the payments were 
made, the result was that when Mr. Scott himself was partially cashed out of the property 
(through his second trade in November, 1974), Miss Freebairn did not receive in a lump 
sum the balance owing on the purchase price, as would an ordinary seller who held a 
mortgage, but was left with her meager monthly sum while Mr. Scott enjoyed the profit 
earned in the transactions. Furthermore, the various deductions for sums owing to Mr. 
Scott and others as described in the Earnest Money Agreement and the closing statement 
(Ex. 12P, Ex 16P) do not coincide, leaving questions about the actual obligations owing 
between the parties. 
It is critical that there was no one at any point during the negotiation or 
consummation of the deal who was able to provide independent advice to the plaintiff. 
Mr. Scott, who assumed the role of her "trustee" in the Earnest Money Agreement, and 
was her guardian at the time of the conveyance, was the very party whose interests were 
adverse to her own. The realtor who supposedly represented Miss Freebairn as the seller 
was an officer in the purchaser corporation and a friend and associate of the actual 
purchaser. 
Finally, despite the finding of the trial court that "La Mar Duncan acted as 
attorney for plaintiff and defendant", the evidence was that the plaintiff never met him 
prior to signing the Earnest Money Agreement (Memorandum Decision and Judgment, 
Finding of Fact 1f 16; Tr. 235-236), that Mr. Duncan billed Mr. Scott personally for his 
legal services in the matter, (although Mr. Scott elected to pay the bill out of his ward's 
estate) (Tr. 184-185, Ex. 29P), and that Mr. Duncan appeared as attorney for Mr. Scott, 
rather than Miss Freebairn, not only on the pleadings in the original guardianship 
proceeding, but in this very action where the interests of the parties are as adverse as 
they could be. (R. 24-26). It is absurd to think that Mr. Duncan was ever in a position to 
offer this transaction to Miss Freebairn. 
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This court has observed that 
Undue influence need not be exerted with bad intentions, or self-interest 
in mind, but may well be an honest overzealousness engendered by good 
motives. 
Brinkerhoff at 101. 
It may well be, as Mr. Scott contends, that he entered into this transaction 
reluctantly, and in order to help his unfortunate cousin. The problem arises however 
when in the process of helping her, he decided to help himself. This very conflict of 
interest between parties to a confidential relationship is the basis for avoiding a 
transaction which unfairly benefits the superior party. Considering the evidence as a 
whole, Mr. Scott did not carry his burden of proving that the transaction was free from 
unfairness, and the evidence weighs heavily in favor of the contrary conclusion that he 
obtained an unfair advantage from it. 
POINT V 
MR. SCOTT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO 
RETURN TO THE PLAINTIFF THE PROFIT 
HE EARNED FROM DEALING WITH HER PROPERTY 
If this court is persuaded to reverse the decision of the trial court, the question 
of what remedy should be afforded to the plaintiff must be reached. The evidence clearly 
establishes the plaintiff's right to the imposition of a constructive trust upon the profit 
Mr. Scott earned from the subsequent sale of the plaintiff's property. 
It is undisputed that nine months after the conveyance of the disputed property 
by the plaintiff to the defendant, the defendant struck a deal to trade that property as 
part of a four party transaction. Mr. Scott took the plaintiff's twenty-five acres, 
combined them with the five acres he acquired from her in the early sixties, and traded 
them for the land under his Salt Lake City office building which he had previously leased. 
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The closing of that four way transaction occurred in January, 1972, and Mr. Jerry Scott 
paid $6,000 an acre to obtain plaintiff's property. (Tr. 123-128)4/ 
Mr. Scott held the property he traded for plaintiff's property until November, 
1974, at which time he sold his office building and the land under it in a single package. 
Because he held the building in the name of the Scott Corporation, and the land under it 
in his own name, Mr. Scott distinguished the portion of the purchase price attributable to 
the land from the portion attributable to the building, assigning 27% of the $777,909.68 
purchase price to the land. A portion of the purchase price was tendered as a down 
payment and the remainder financed by Mr. Scott (Tr. 123-136). 
Regardless of the grounds upon which the trial court's ruling is reversed, the 
imposition of a constructive trust is the proper remedy. The Restatement of the Law of 
Restitution, provides that: 
Where a person in a fiduciary relation to another acquires property, and 
the acquisition or retention of the property is in violation of his duty as a 
fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive trust for the other. . . . 
Where a fiduciary holds property upon a constructive trust for the 
beneficiary under the rule stated in this Section and exchanges the 
property for other property, the beneficiary is entitled to enforce a 
constructive trust or equitable lien upon the property so acquired in 
exchange . . . 
Restatement of the Law of Restitution. § 190 (1937) and Comment c thereto. See also 
the authorities cited for this proposition in Plaintiff's Opening Brief at pages 50-54. 
If the court concludes that the deed from Miss Freebairn to Mr. Scott should be 
cancelled on account of her lack of mental capacity, the remedy is the same; any dealings 
with the property by Mr. Scott are deemed to be for Miss Freebairn's benefit. 
5/ The trial court's finding that this sale occurred "two years later" is simply 
wrong; the undisputed evidence is that the purchase by Mr. Young was in January, 1972, 
less than a year after the conveyance to Scott. 
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The plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant approximately 83% of 
the proceeds from the sale of the land under the office building, plus interest, less a 
credit for sums paid by him pursuant to the Earnest Money Agreement. It may be 
necessary to remand the case for an accounting between the parties, but it is critical that 
this court make a decision about the proper remedy in this matter, to avoid the possibility 
of another appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff is only asking that Mr. Scott be held to his own representations in 
his petition for appointment as Miss Freebairn's guardian, and that the law provide her 
with the protection which guardianship is supposed to afford to the mentally disabled. 
The Third District Court accepted Mr. Scott's assertion that Miss Freebairn was unable to 
manage her own property and was likely to be imposed upon by others. To permit the 
enforcement of a contract entered into with the guardian just a few weeks before the 
petition, by which almost all her property was transferred to him, would make a mockery 
of the purposes of guardianship. 
Even if this Court is not persuaded that the transaction is invalid as a matter 
of law, a review of the evidence will reveal that the trial court was simply wrong in its 
conclusions that Miss Freebairn was competent to contract and that the transaction was 
fair. Mr. Scott himself has sworn that she was unable to understand the meaning of a 
contract and the evidence proved him right. If there were any doubt, it is removed by 
Exhibit 41P, a rare contemporaneous record of the plaintiff's mental state, which tells 
the whole story of her delusion, her misunderstanding of the transactions, and the internal 
compulsion which led her to sign it. 
Furthermore, Mr. Scott never proved the transaction was fair. To accept his 
position, one would have to conclude that between 1964, when Mr. Scott paid 
Miss Freebairn $3,000 an acre for property from the same parcel, and 1971, her land 
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decreased in value by at least $400 an acre, but that less than a year afterwards, it 
miraculously increased in value to more than twice that amount. 
Finally, the remedy sought is nothing more than the return of the profit which 
Mr. Scott earned by dealing with Miss Freebairn's property for his own benefit, when he 
should have been acting for her benefit. For these reasons, the trial court's judgment 
should be reversed. 
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APPENDIX A 
MET MR. LAMAR DUNCAN? 
A IT WAS -- I HAD GONE TO RU55ELLT5 OFFICE ON THE 
13TH OF JANUARY AND MR. BURTON HAD DRAWN UP THIS -- WHAT 
DO THEY CALL THAT? 
Q WAS THAT THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT? 
A EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT. 
Q LET ME STOP YOU THERE, MISS FREEBAIRN, BEFORE WE 
TALK ABOUT THAT. 
BEFORE JANUARY .13TH THE DAY YOU WENT UP TO SEE 
ABOUT THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT, HAD YOU EVER MET 
MR. LAMAR DUNCAN? 
A NO. BUT I WAS NOT UNACQUAINTED WITH HIS NAME 
BECAUSE HIS NAME APPEARED ON SOME OF THOSE THINGS COMING 
IN LIKE THAT --
Q DO YOU REMEMBER A MATTER RELATING TO ROYAL 
FURNITURE? 
A THAT WAS IT. IT WAS THIS THING IN COURT OVER 
THE ROYAL FURNITURE. 
Q NOW, DID YOU KNOW HE REPRESENTED YO'U IN THAT? 
A I CAN REMEMBER WHAT MR. LAMAR DUNCAN DID, AND I 
GOT IT SECOND-HAND FROM RUSSELL. HE PUT A HOMESTEAD 
SOMETHING ON MY HOUSE. HE PUT A PHONY MORTGAGE ON MY 
HOUSE AND -- BUT I HAD NEVER SEEN HIM OR SPOKEN TO HIM. 
Q IF YOU HAD NEVER SPOKEN TO HIM, HOW DID HE COME 
TO DO THOSE THINGS? 
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A BECAUSE RUSSELL WAS A MEMBER OF THE TABERNACLE 
CHOIR WITH MR, DUNCAN AND A FRIEND, AND BESIDES I THINK HE 
EMPLOYED HIM AS A LAWYER. AND SO ALL THAT TOOK PLACE 
BEFORE THIS THING WAS EVER GONE UP -- THE FIRST TIME I 
WENT TO SEE MR. DUNCAN WAS THAT DAY AFTER THE 1.3TH OF 
JANUARY WHEN 1 --
Q LET ME STOP YOU THERE. SO, BEFORE THE 13TH OF 
JANUARY YOU KNEW THAT HE HAD HANDLED SOME THINGS RELATING 
TO YOU? 
A THE HOMESTEAD THING AND --
Q THE ONES YOU MENTIONED? 
A AND THE MORTGAGE. 
Q YOU NEVER MET HIM OR TALKED TO HIM ABOUT THESE 
THINGS? 
A I HAD NEVER SEEN HIM, NO. 
Q YOU DIDN'T KNOW MR. LAMAR DUNCAN SO SOMEONE ELSE 
ARRANGED FOR HIM TO DO THESE THINGS? 
A YES, THAT WAS RIGHT. 
Q NOW, WHAT IS YOUR RECOLLECTION OF THE DAY 
JANUARY 13TH, 1971, THAT YOU BEGAN TO DESCRIBE? WHAT 
HAPPENED ON THAT DAY? 
A WELL, I WENT INTO RUSSELL!S OFFICE AND THEY WERE 
BUSY. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE PROPERTY. 
THEY HAD SAID THEY NEEDED MY SIGNATURE TO GET SOMETHING 
GOING THERE, AND I SAID, ?,WELL, I DIDN'T COME HERE PREPARED 
TO DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT MY PROPERTY. AND I SAID, "IF I 
GIVE YOU MY SIGNATURE," I SAID, "IT WOULD ONLY BE ON THE 
PROVISION THAT YOU HAVE SOME LAWYER LOOK AT IT AFTERWARD." 
AND SO LER TYPES UP THIS EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
AND I REALIZED AFTER I LEFT THERE THAT DAY THAT I DIDN'T 
EVEN HAVE IT IN MY POSSESSION, BUT I WAS --
Q YOU DIDN'T HAVE WHAT IN YOUR POSSESSION? 
A THE COPY. I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO TAKE IT TO 
SOMEONE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THAN MR. DUNCAN BECAUSE HE WAS 
RUSSELL'S LAWYER, BUT I DIDNTT HAVE A COPY, AND I THOUGHT 
WHAT HAVE I DONE, YOU KNOW. 
SO, I WAS REALLY CLAMMY. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW 
SICK I FELT BECAUSE SOME OF THOSE FIGURES ON THERE, $57,000 
-- IS THAT WHAT IT SAYS ON THAT EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
THERE? 
Q YOU MAY LOOK AT EXHIBIT 12-P. 
A I WAS TRYING TO RECALL WHAT WAS ON THERE. 
THE TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE OF $57,200. WELL, THAT 
JUST HIT ME, YOU KNOW, LIKE I HAD BEEN KNOCKED OVER BY A 
CAR BECAUSE I THOUGHT, WHAT ARE THOSE GUYS TALKING ABOUT? 
YOU KNOW, SAM HAD JUST SOLD LIKE TWO LOTS AND I HAD 
RECEIVED $14,000 FROM HIM AND HE STILL OWED ME -- IT'S 
RIGHT HERE -- $96,990. THE PURCHASE PRICE, $14,000 PAID 
TO ME FROM HIM -- $82,990, BALANCE DUE, FOUR LOTS. LET'S 
SEE. NO. EXCUSE ME. I'M GOING TO MESS YOU UP. LOT 
RELEASE PRICE $1,202.82. FOUR LOTS HAD BEEN RELEASED AND 
THE BUYER IS ENTITLED TO GET SEVEN ADDITIONAL LOTS. 
Q NOW, LET ME JUST TELL YOU THAT WE'LL HAVE A 
i 
CHANCE TO ASK MR. HALLIDAY ABOUT THOSE LATER. i 
I 
NOW, YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT YOUR REACTION TO THE | 
( 
FIGURES TO THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT ON JANUARY 13. | 
A OH, I SEE. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS CAME LATER, BUT 
THAT WAS MY RECOLLECTION IN MY OWN MIND ABOUT WHAT I OWNED, 
AND 1 THOUGHT WHAT ARE THOSE GUYS TALKING ABOUT HERE, I 
$57,000. 
Q WAS $57,000 A'FIGURE THAT YOU HAD GIVEN TO j 
MR. BURTON OR TO MR. SCOTT? 
A NO. BUT IT WAS SOMETHING THAT I HAD SEEN THAT 
DAY, SEE. 
Q NOW, DID YOU EVER TELL MR. BURTON OR MR. SCOTT 
THAT YOU WANTED TO SELL THE PROPERTY FOR $57,000? 
A NO. I WAS ABSOLUTELY ILL. I 
Q DID YOU EVER TELL THEM THAT YOU WANTED TO SELL 
THE PROPERTY FOR $65,000? 
A OH, THAT FIGURE, TOO, WAS OUTRAGEOUS TO ME, YES. 
Q BUT YOU SAW IT ON THE DOCUMENT THAT DAY? 
A I SAW IT ON THE DOCUMENT AND I THOUGHT, I DON?T 
SEE HOW THIS CAN BENEFIT AGNES. IT'S JUST SOMETHING I 
DONTT UNDERSTAND AT ALL. 
Q DO YOU RECALL A PARAGRAPH IN THE DOCUMENT THAT 
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1 I TALKED ABOUT A TRUST? YOU MAY REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION 
2 BY READING IT, IF YOU WOULD LIKE. 
3 A WELL, THIS WENT BACK TO MY -- I HAD PNEUMONIA, 
4 | TO MY HAVING HAD PNEUMONIA AT COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL. 
Q WAS THIS BEFORE JANUARY 13, 1971? 
A IT WAS LIKE THE VERY SAME TIME OF YEAR IN !69. 
7 | AND I HOPE IT WAS -- LET'S SEE. MY LITTLE NIECE IS JUST 
20 --
9 J Q THAT'S CLOSE ENOUGH. BUT WHAT DOES COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL HAVE TO DO WITH THAT? 
A I WAS OUT THERE WITH PNEUMONIA AND RUSSELL HAD 
10 
11 
12 AGREED WITH THE HOSPITAL TO ADMIT ME. YOU KNOW, THEY 
13 AGREED TO ADMIT ME ON THE BASIS OF HIS SAYING HE WOULD 
14 I COVER THESE EXPENSES. AND, BOY, BELIEVE ME THEY WOULDN'T 
15 I ADMIT YOU OTHERWISE EVEN THOUGH YOU'RE DYING OF PNEUMONIA. 
16 BUT THE DOCTOR WANTED TO KNOW WHERE I -- HE TOLD ME, HE 
17 SAYS, "GEE/ 1 HE SAYS, "THESE X-RAYS ARE SO EXTRAORDINARY.11 
18 HE SAID, "WE NEVER SEEN SUCH A CASE OF PNEUMONIA." HE 
19 SAYS, "THEY'RE GOING TO BE IN THE MEDICAL CENTER." HE 
20 SAYS, "THE ONLY REASON YOU SURVIVED PNEUMONIA WAS BECAUSE 
21 OF YOUR EXCELLENT HEALTH." 
22 I HAVE ALWAYS HAD EXCELLENT HEALTH, BUT I'M 
23 AFRAID I NEVER HAD EMOTIONAL HEALTH. BUT ANYWAY, HERE I 
24 J WAS JUST -- AND THEN THE DOCTOR SAID, "HAVE YOU BEEN ANY 
25 OTHER PLACE? I HAVE NEVER SEEN THIS GERM." 
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I SAID, "YES. I WAS IN THE EAST AND I WENT THERE i 
TO SEE THE F.B.I. AND I WANTED TO CONTACT A LAWYER THAT WAS ! 
I 
BEYOND THE REACH OF THE DESERET NEWS OR THE L.D.S. CHURCH." i 
I 
Q WHAT DID YOU WANT TO TALK TO THE F.B.I. ABOUT? j 
A WELL, BECAUSE UP TO THAT POINT I FELT I HAD • 
REALLY BEEN TREATED OUTRAGEOUSLY AND I WANTED THEM TO 
UNDERSTAND WHAT I WAS HAVING TO PUT UP WITH. 
Q SO, YOU TOLD THE DOCTOR THAT? 
A YES, I DID. AND SO HE TOLD RUSSELL, HE TOLD MY 
BROTHER SAM, I THINK HE TOLD THEM TOGETHER OR IN TURN, 
BECAUSE SAM CAME TO VISIT ME EVERY NIGHT THAT I WAS IN 
THE HOSPITAL. 
Q WHAT DID THE DOCTOR TELL THEM? 
A HE SAID, "I'M AFRAID YOUR SISTER --" 
MR. JORDAN: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT AT 
THIS POINT, HEARSAY TESTIMONY. 
MR. HOUPT: IT'S NOT OFFERED FOR THE TRUTH OF 
THE MATTER, BUT IT GOES TO THE STATE OF MIND OF THE WITNESS 
HERE, HOW IT AFFECTS HER VIEW. I DON'T OFFER THIS FOR 
ANYTHING OF THE TRUTH. 
THE COURT: IT CAN BE ADMITTED ON THAT BASIS. 
AS IT'S NOT A JURY TRIAL I WILL LET IT IN. 
THE WITNESS: BUT THE DOCTOR TOLD RUSSELL AND 
RUSSELL IN TURN TOLD MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF MY FAMILY 
THAT THE DOCTOR THOUGHT, YOU KNOW, THAT I WAS MENTALLY 
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ILL BECAUSE I WAS FEARFUL OF THOSE INVISIBLE INFLUENCES 
AND I HAD GONE TO SEE THE F.B.I. AND I HAD GONE SO FAR 
FROM HOME. 
Q (BY MR. HOUPT) NOW, LET ME STOP YOU THERE AND 
ASK YOU AGAIN TO THINK ABOUT THE DOCUMENT, THE EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT. 
A DOWN HERE? 
Q YES. NOW, YOU SAID THAT MR. BURTON TYPED THE 
AGREEMENT UP WHILE YOU WERE THERE. 
A HE DID. THIS WAS HIS TYPING. 
Q NOW, YOU SEE THAT PROVISION IN THERE THAT TALKS 
ABOUT A TRUST BEING SET UP WITH MR. SCOTT, THAT MR. SCOTT 
WAS TO SERVE AS TRUSTEE? DO YOU SEE THAT PROVISION? 
A THE PURCHASE OF THIS PROPERTY IS BY AGREEMENT 
TO BUYER AND SELLER AND THE DEED IS TO BE GIVEN ON 
POSSESSION DATE WITHOUT ANY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY ACTING 
AS SECURITY FOR FUTURE PAYMENTS, AND ALL OF THE RIGHTS AND 
BENEFITS TO SELLER ARISING AS PART OF THIS AGREEMENT ARE 
TO BE PLACED IN A PROTECTIVE TRUST FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
SAFEGUARDING THE ASSETS AND WELFARE OF THE SELLER TO THE 
EXTENT THAT THE INCOME SHE NEEDS FOR PERSONAL WELFARE 
CANNOT BE PRAYED UPON BY OTHERS AND -- AND YOU SHOULD 
HAVE HEARD THOSE ATTORNEYS HOWL AFTER I SHOWED THAT TO SOME 
LATER ATTORNEYS. 
Q NO. I WANT YOU NOW TO FOCUS BACK TO 
JANUARY 13TH OF T 71. 
NOW, AFTER MR. BURTON TYPED UP THE DOCUMENT, THAT 
PARAGRAPH WAS THERE. 
A OH, IT WAS, VERY DEFINITELY. 
Q NOW, DID YOU SUGGEST TO MR, BURTON THAT THIS 
TRUST BE SET UP? 
A BUT RUSSELL SAID IF HE WAS GOING TO HELP ME 
ANYTIME AFTER THAT
 D O S E OF PNEUMONIA THAT HE WOULD LIKE 
TO DO IT ON THAT BASIS, 
Q ON WHAT BASIS? 
A OF HIM BEING IN A GUARDIANSHIP POSITION. 
I HAD NEVER HEARD OF A GUARDIANSHIP, YOU KNOW, 
AND THAT WAS KIND OF A NEW CONCEPT TO ME, BUT THAT WAS 
SOMETHING THAT --
Q NOW, THAT IS YOUR SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT; 
ISNTT IT? 
A THAT IS. AND I WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO GIVE IT 
THAT DAY BECAUSE I JUST HADN'T HAD MY DOCUMENTS WITH ME 
AND THAT FIGURE, $57,000, YOU KNOW, JUST MADE ME SICK. 
Q IF THE FIGURE OF $57,000 MADE YOU SICK, WHY 
DID YOU SIGN THE DOCUMENT? 
A BECAUSE THEY SAID -- IT SAID, I THINK EVEN HERE, 
SOMETHING THAT IT WOULD BE REFERRED TO A LAWYER. I DON'T 
KNOW WHERE IT IS IN HERE, BUT IT MADE THAT PROVISION. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROVISION? 
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A IF A LAWYER FOUND ANYTHING TO DISPUTE, THAT HE 
WOULD DISREGARD THE SIGNATURE. I MEAN THAT SIGNATURE 
WOULDN'T STAND FOR HIM, BUT THEY HAD SAID, "WELL, WE'LL 
NEED YOUR SIGNATURE TO GET GOING." IT WAS WHAT THEY SAID 
TO ME. 
Q WELL, IF YOU WERE UNSURE ABOUT IT AND DIDN'T 
HAVE YOU DOCUMENTS AND YOU WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE FIGURE, 
WHY DID YOU SIGN IT, THEN AND NOT SAY, "ITM GOING TO TALK 
TO A LAWYER/1 AND THEN TALK TO ONE? 
A BECAUSE, AS YOU WILL SEE, I THINK IT'S --
ANYBODY STUDYING MY LIFE WOULD BE IMPRESSED WITH A COUPLE 
OF THINGS, AND THAT IS THE STEADFASTNESS IN WHICH I CAN 
STICK TO AN AGREEMENT LIKE. YOU KNOW, THESE FELLOWS HAD 
COME TO ME, ROBERT RUSSELL AND RUSSELL SCOTT, AND THEY 
SAID, nIF YOUTRE GOING TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT YOUR PROPERTY 
AND YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE SOME EXPENSES THAT YOU CAN'T 
MEET, YOU KNOW, IF YOU SELL ANY OF IT," THEY SAID, "SELL 
IT TO US BECAUSE EITHER THAT PLACE IS GOING TO BE 
DEVELOPED ACCORDING TO, YOU KNOW, A MASTER PLAN OR IT'S 
GOING TO BE DEVELOPED BY PIECEMEAL AND IT WILL BE RUINED." 
AND SO I WAS VERY STEADFASTLY LOYAL TO THAT 
AGREEMENT TO DO THAT BECAUSE THERE WAS A FELLOW THAT HAD 
BEEN IN THE EASTERN STATES MISSION AND CAME HOME AND WENT 
INTO BANKING, AND HIS NAME WAS -- WAS JUST A YOUNG 
MISSIONARY WHEN I MET HIM, AND HE WAS THERE CRANKING OUT 
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THE WARD BULLETIN AND I GOT HOME HERE AND RAN INTO HIM ON 
THE STREET, AND HE WAS NOT UNACQUAINTED WITH MY PROPERTY 
AND HE TALKED TO ME ABOUT MY PROPERTY. I WAS SO 
SURPRISED AND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AN OFFER 
ON THAT PROPERTY AND I THINK IF YOU WERE TO CONTACT HIM 
HE WOULD TELL YOU THAT HE OFFERED ME FOUR THOUSAND FOR 
IT. AND I TOLD HIM AT THE TIME, I SAID, nWELL, I'M JUST 
DEALING WITH RELATIVES." 
MR. JORDAN: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: SUSTAINED. 
MR. JORDAN: HEARSAY. AND I MOVE THAT THE LAST 
REMARKS BE STRICKEN AS UNRESPONSIVE. 
THE COURT: THEY WILL BE STRICKEN. 
Q (BY MR. HOUPT) WHY DID YOU SIGN THE AGREEMENT, 
THAI'S THE QUESTION I!M ASKING. 
A BECAUSE I WAS TRUSTING THAT THOSE FOLKS WOULD 
DO WHAT I STIPULATED, I SAID VERBALLY, AND AGREED TO IT 
VERBALLY THAT THEY WOULD — REFERRING IT TO AN ATTORNEY. 
AND I SAID, "I JUST'DON'T COME HERE, YOU KNOW, PREPARED 
TO DISCUSS MY PROPERTY,11 AND I SAID, MAND ANYTHING THAT 
TAKES PLACE HERE WILL HAVE TO BE REVIEWED BY AN ATTORNEY, 
AND I DON'T KNOW IF THIS SAYS, "SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL 
OF AN ATTORNEY," OR NOT. I HAVEN'T REVIEWED IT THAT 
RECENTLY. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO THEN WHEN YOU LEFT THE OFFICE 
THAT DAY? 
A WELL, TWO WHOLE WEEKS WENT BY AND IF I HAD 
THAT AGREEMENT I WOULD HAVE TAKEN IT TO MY OWN -- OR A 
4 j LAWYER INDEPENDENT OF -- BECAUSE THAT WAS RUSSELL'S 
LAWYER AND 1 WANTED TO SHOW -- I WAS JUST SICK. I 
CANTT TELL YOU HOW SICK I FELT ABOUT IT. AND I WENT 
OVER TO MR. DUNCAN AND I SAYS THEY HADN'T BEEN THERE, 
8
 | AND I SAYS BUT HE COULD CALL THEM IN. SO, I WENT BACK 
9
 J AND I SAW HIM -- I THINK 1 EITHER SAW HIM AGAIN 
I 
10
 I INDIVIDUALLY BECAUSE BEFORE WE ALL MET TOGETHER, OR JUST 
11
 | BEFORE WE ALL MET TOGETHER HE SAID, nYOU EXCHANGED YOUR 
REAL PROPERTY FOR AN UNSECURED NOTE," AND THEN THAT WAS 
WHEN HE STARTED TO SCHOOL ME ON THE SUBJECT OF A 
GUARDIANSHIP. 
NOW, I HADN'T BROUGHT IT UP AND HE HAD ALL 
THESE BOOKS READY TO REFER TO, AND THAT'S WHY IN THE 
DEPOSITION OVER THERE I SAID I LEFT FEELING LIKE I HAD 
BEEN CLUBBED OVER THE HEAD, BECAUSE IT WAS SO HUMILIATING 
TO THINK SOMEBODY THOUGHT I HAD TWO LEFT FEET AND NEEDED 
A GUARDIAN. BUT HE HAD FULLY DIVULGED THE CONCEPT FOR ME 
TO CONSIDER. 
Q NOW, BASED ON YOUR DISCUSSION WITH MR. DUNCAN 
WHEN YOU WENT TO SEE HIM AFTER SIGNING THIS, DID YOU COME 
AWAY, THEN, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS TOO LATE 
TO GET OUT OF THE AGREEMENT? 
12 
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A I SURE DIDN'T WANT IT. HERE I WAS DEALING'WITH 
AN INVISIBLE INFLUENCE, BUT --
Q WHAT INVISIBLE INFLUENCE? 
A MR. UDALL. 
Q WHAT DID THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THIS? 
A OKAY. I WAS ABSOLUTELY 100 PERCENT INFALLIBLY 
SURE HE WAS IN THE CITY, AND IF THERE WAS SOME WAY TO 
COME FACE-TO-FACE WITH HIM, BECAUSE HE WAS NOT UNACQUAINTED 
WITH MY PROPERTY IN THAT HE HAD EVEN WRITTEN ME A LITTLE 
LETTER THAT SAID: GEE, I REALLY ADMIRE, YOU KNOW, YOUR 
-- YOU KNOW, THE WAY YOU HAVE GONE ABOUT ALL THIS AND 
BROUGHT ALL THIS ABOUT, ALL THOSE PLANS AND EVERYTHING. 
AND SO I THOUGHT, GEE, IF MR. UDALL -- YOU KNOW, IF I COULD 
JUST SEE HIM FACE-TO-FACE I WOULDN!T HAVE TO GO THROUGH 
WITH THIS AT ALL. 
Q NOW, WHY WOULD SEEING MR. UDALL HAVE KEPT YOU 
FROM HAVING TO GO THROUGH WITH THIS DEAL? 
A BECAUSE ACCORDING TO MY UNDERSTANDING HE WAS 
SPENDING MONEY LIKE IT WAS RUNNING OUT OF THE TAP. HE 
HAD PLANES COMING OVER MY HOUSE. HE HAD PLANES -- HE HAD 
VERY EXPENSIVE CARS COMING DOWN MY STREET. HE HAD JEEPS 
COMING AROUND THE CORNER. HE WAS SPENDING MONEY, MONEY, 
MONEY. I THOUGHT IF I HAD THE PRICE OF ONE OF THOSE --
YOU KNOW, MY BROTHER TOOK FLYING LESSONS, AND I THINK I 
EVEN LOOKED INTO THIS AT ONE TIME, BUT TO BRING A PIPER 
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CUB JUST OVER OUR HOUSE, THE PRICE OF THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN | 
$25. HERE HE HAD THOSE PLANES OVER HERE EVERY HOUR AND \ 
i 
NOT JUST THE PIPER CUB, BUT HUGE, GIANT PLANES, YOU KNOW, j 
j 
AND I THOUGHT, MAN, THIS MAN IS JUST -- YOU KNOW, I THOUGHT j 
i 
MR. UDALL COULD DO, YOU KNOW, ANYTHING. AND SO THAT'S WHY j 
! 
I THOUGHT IF I COULD JUST SOMEHOW, JUST GET TO THIS j 
MR. UDALL --
Q WERE YOU ABLE TO GET TO MR. UDALL? 
A NO. 1 ASKED SEVERAL TIMES TO MEET HIM AND HE ! 
HAS NEVER COME FORTH. 
BUT I WOULD ALSO GIVE MY -- I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU 
COULD TALK OR EXDECT THEM TO BELIEVE YOU, BUT THEY MAKE 
THESE SOUNDS INTO MY HOUSE AND THERE'S A CONVERSATION THAT 
GOES BACK-AND-FORTH. 
Q IN YOUR HOUSE? 
A YES. 
Q BUT WHO ARE THE PARTIES TO THE CONVERSATION? 
A I PERCEIVE THAT IS MR. UDALL AND HEfS GUARDING 
MY HOUSE. 
NOW, I JUST WANT TO SAY THIS, THAT WHEN, YOU 
KNOW -- WHEN MR. -- OH, WHEN THE COURT DECIDED THAT 
MR. SCOTT -- REMEMBER JUDGE FISHLER SAID, "YOU HAVE GOT 
TO GET A CONSERVATOR." AT THAT TIME I WAS EQUALLY SURE 
THAT MR. UDALL WOULD ACCEPT THE POSITION. SO, I HAD --
Q THAT'S A MATTER OF RECORD AND PROBABLY NOT 
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